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The indigenous TD established a force of personnel; approximately combat soldiers with the remainder being considered support personnel.

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S Discussion also focused on those measures necessary to reestablish STD in its primary role of strategic intelligence collection. The genesis of the Golf 5 Security Company is amplified on page In addition to the Montagnard tribesmen, there were a few Nungs soldiers of Chinese extraction and some Vietnamese.

Whenever subjects required more detailed explanations a separate interpreter was required to translate the information for each of the three separate tribes. An additional interpreter was sometimes required in order to converse with the few Vietnamese members of SMF who, as a general rule, did not speak or understand any of the Montagnard dialects. These special mission teams operated as subordinate elements advised by LSAD.

The RT members also participated in various specialized training programs which included basic airborne training, High Altitude Low Opening HALO airborne training, long range patrolling, extensive night movement, helicopter rappelling, air mobile operations, and the use of the STABO personnel harness for inserting. Prior to their assignment to SMF the majority of the SMF indigenous soldiers were well qualified as individuals to conduct small unit combat operations.

The US personnel commanding the indigenous force came to SMF with a background in special operations techniques. SMF was organized into three platoons under a force headquarters element and an administrative section see figure Each US platoon leader had an indigenous counterpart platoon leader.

All command decisions, however, both in the rear area and in the field were the responsibility of the US platoon leader. In the cantonment area, by contrast, indigenous leaders were given maximum latitude to influence the actions of their personnel at platoon, squad, and fire team level. In most instances the US Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant issued orders through their counterparts, but by way of defining US command responsibility, it was not unusual, if the situation dictated, for US Platoon Leaders to give specific guidance to individual riflemen.

Because there were only two US assigned to each platoon the judgment of indigenous leaders inevitably influenced decisions in the field. This was the rule rather than the exception since many combat operations employed squads performing as independent elements. The level of expertise and training of the individual indigenous soldier generally assured him to be of sound judgment, in some cases able to issue actions and orders as effective as those that might have been expected from US leadership in similiar situations.

The indigenous TD established a force of personnel; approximately combat soldiers with the remainder being considered support personnel. A US platoon leader and his platoon sergeant commanded each of the three separate platoons even though the indigenous platoon had an internal chain of command, i.

A US major O-4 commanded SMF and was backed by a Montagnard counterpart who was the titular indigenous commander, and a highly respected former tribal chieftain. SMF did not experience the attrition trends among indigenous troops one would expect to find in a similar US unit. The Montagnard soldiers responded to orders with a degree of alacrity rarely found in US soldiers serving even in the most ideal of circumstances. Such responsive support insured maximum combat readiness for operations requiring, special equipment.

Items which required immediate delivery were shipped on a priority basis using STDAT contract aircraft. Indigenous administrative matters to include awards and decorations, leaves and passes, hiring and firing, messing, billeting, limited family assistance, and pay disbursement were a US responsibility. Cmdr SMF had carte blanche authority to hire and terminate indigenous personnel and thereby exercised an exceptionally potent brand of command leverage.

SMF continuously received applications from indigenous personnel, special warfare qualified, seeking job vacancies. Drawing from a large pool of applicants SMF was able to select well qualified, highly trained soldiers, many of whom spoke and understood English. The soldier working for SMF realized that he could be replaced by someone of equal training and ability at any time. More than 50 per cent of the indigenous families lived within the compound area. Both soldiers and families enjoyed, by their standards, excellent living facilities.

A Montagnard mess hall provided a well-balanced diet of well prepared food. Low sick call rates and the few patients in the dispensary indicated the good health and vitality of the troops. Financial records accounting was done by SMF; however, headquarters STDAT-l58 maintained the personnel records on indigenous employees, thus minimizing the need to maintain detailed administrative records. The initial emphasis, following the reorganization of GSC, was to train SMF personnel to perform the missions they had been tasked to execute on a contingency basis.

One of these missions was to perform crash site inspections. Prior to activation of SMF the Golf- 5 Security Company had been tasked with crash site inspections and remains recovery missions on two separate occasions, following the crash of a China Air Lines contract C flight carrying 32 personnel on board and that of a Cathay Pacific flight carrying 82 personnel. There were no survivors in either crash.

Most of the personnel assigned to the Golf-5 Security Company, as has been previously mentioned, subsequently formed the nucleus of SMF. After it was apparent that the plane had crashed, a force of 16 US and 55 indigenous personnel rappelled from HELOs onto the crash site. Severe weather conditions hampered the initial search efforts, but recovery work began on 9 June and continued through 16 June, during which time all of the bodies were recovered: The Cathay Pacific recovery operation began on 16 June when a force of 3 US and 25 indigenous personnel located and recovered 65 bodies.

Crash site inspections and body recovery missions are difficult to simulate. Even though the task of body recovery and aircraft inspection is a grisly task invaluable lessons were learned from these CSI missions. SMF personnel by virtue of this actual experience became qualified and trained to perform CSI missions. July — 16 Aug In order to insure that the level of combat training and special operations techniques were consistent throughout the Force, SMF began an intensive two week training program as soon as the Pleiku compound was occupied and the personnel organized under the new JTD.

The initial training concept was to launch a program designed to teach fundamental, conventional infantry tactics and the use of individual and crew served weapons at the lowest echelon, i. Such a program required ranges and areas of operations; enough real estate to accommodate a man force.

In addition to the required training area, there were other considerations; lesson plans, qualified instructors, safety personnel, and all of the other support necessary to conduct an effective basic training operation. Some of these requirements constituted serious obstacles to the program. Approximately SMF personnel attended the training each day. The training cycle did, in fact, provide an excellent background for all subsequent SMF training.

Weapons were technically inspected and the necessary repairs were made. After numerous inspections, it was apparent that indigenous soldiers had a professional concern for the care and maintenance of both individual and crew served weapons. The logical progression for the next phase of training was to simulate various aspects of contingent missions and to develop reflexive reactions to specific tactical situations.

From the very beginning of training, air assets were difficult to obtain. C 17 Aug - 23 Aug: During this period SMF trained on those particular subjects and operational techniques which were expected to be most beneficial on actual operations.

A priority requirement existed to teach the indigenous personnel mission essential communication procedures and basic radio maintenance. Much of the training conducted during this period was given on a formal basis in the classroom. The relatively complicated instruction on long range night operations, land navigation, and immediate action drill exemplified the exasperating experiences SMF periodically encountered in an attempt to insure that all three Montagnard tribes, Chinese, and VN received the subject matter translated and delivered in terms they understood.

The results of practical exercises indicated that the important points were being conveyed with some degree of accuracy. Also during this period considerable emphasis was given to the important subject of night defensive positions NDP. C 23 Aug - 30 Aug: Training up to this time had been conducted in relatively secure areas under simulated combat conditions. From this point on most of the training was conducted on actual operations where the eneny threat was real and the possibility of contact imminent.

After a day of uneventful patrolling, a platoon intercepted and pursued two armed VC on 25 August. Following the VC to the east, the platoon discovered a small, recently vacated base camp at AR Leaving its heavy equipment and rucksacks secured by one squad, the platoon - followed fresh trails leading east.

After passing through an abandoned VC way station, the platoon leader dispatched a six-man recon team to the north whete it encountered and wounded one of the fleeing VC. Three more men were spotted running toward the north and were fired upon with unknown results. Interrogation disclosed that he was a local force VC running a waystation for small NVA units moving south. The operation terminated without further incident on the morning of the 26th. SMF was at the location of the crash site by where the eight victims were recovered and their remains transferred to the Camp Holloway Graves Registration GR detachment.

All personal effects and bodies were sent to Saigon by C The entire operation was accomplished without incident, and remains identification by Saigon GR turned out to be a comparatively easy task because of the thorough recovery of personal effects, which later accompanied the remains to.

Every effort was made to recover as much physical evidence as possible so as to meet the corroborative legal requirements for verification of deceased status. C 31 Aug - 10 Sep Since effective support in the field was a function of timely requests clearly and accurately transmitted to the SMF Tactical Operations Center TOC , communications training continued to be emphasized: This exercise tested the concept of using the MRC as a compact radio system at a launch site, or forward CP.

Pleiku Province allocated their daily work helicopter to SMF on 7 Sep for rigging and rappelling training in which a refresher class on helicopter rappelling was given to the personnel of two platoons.

The landing pad inside the SMF compound proved to be large and safe enough. During this period SMF also established a training area south of Pleiku, easily accessible by road in the vicinity of coordinates AR The training in this area included live raid drills, live fire hasty withdrawals, immediate action drills, and practical application in the deployment and placement of mechanical ambushes.

Practical exercises were the key to this training. C 10 Sep - 17 Sep SMF conducted another live training exercise northeast of Pleiku from Sep. This training demonstrated the physical stamina and psychological temperament required to conduct protracted field operations with minimum logistical support.

SMF troops stood up well to long distance movement through rough terrain in inclement weather. The key to their durability may have been that many of the meals prepared in the field were supplemented by a variety of edible jungle plants. SMF troops displayed their native skill for quiet, undetected movement through the jungle. However, when the unit was preparing the NDP, many of the soldiers talked too loud and too much and required a special leadership effort to eliminate this practice.

The malarial soldier was eventual1y extracted from the field and treated. Such slow response to a dangerous medical problem obstructed operational effectiveness and once again emphasized the scarcity of air assets.

During this period two platoons made enemy contacts from which valuable lessons were derived. Moving through dense underbrush, the point man of one of the platoons encountered two enemy before a cooking fire at a distance of less than ten feet.

Armed with an M, the point man realized that his round would not arm at this distance. Taking advantage of his momentary hesitation, the startled enemy bolted down the hill and vanished into a tangle of vines and bushes. The lesson learned in this incident was the advisibility of using a buckshot cartridge in the M when carried by the pointman. In a concurrent engagement another platoon lost its chance to kill or capture enemy they observed at close range because of an inaccurate radio transmission.

As a result of this incident, radio communication training was given added emphasis. C 17 Sep - 1 Oct During this training week SMF continued to receive limited helicopter support from Province and was able to conduct rappelling with personnel wearing full combat loads. Several problems were experienced during the course of this reconnaissance effort. Platoon areas of operation were assigned daily and individual platoons directed to employ a cloverleaf movement from patrol bases established at suitable points.

These tactics allowed squads, whose heavy gear was dropped at the base, to cover a wider area more quietly and with less fatigue. Initial area of operation map sheet was north of QL Local coordination with the ARVN regimental advisor was made on the afternoon of the 23rd. During the day one platoon discovered fresh bunkers containing medical supplies and blood traces. Immediately upon entry and for the remainder of the next day, 27 Sep, SMF discovered in an old tea plantation numerous bunkers that gave evidence of being less than 3 weeks old and of having been inhabited as recently as the last days.

The bunkers were large enough to accommodate a regimental HQs and contained trails and commo wire within meters of the road. No enemy was encountered, but there was evidence that he had just evacuated his defensive positions. Intelligence received 27 Sep indicated the possibility of enemy infiltration from the South and Southeast and the location of enemy mortar sites at grid intersection Three ambush positions were established after dark on 27 Sep.

One ambush was initiated ZA about Sep against an estimated 10 enemy with unknown results. Several well beaten trails were found running eastwest toward a tea plantation in the area, but no enemy contact was made. All platoons were picked up and returned to SMF compound Sep Several problems were experienced during this operation. The area of operation, distinctly identified by prominent terrain features, was assigned exclusively to SMF.

The operation graphically illustrated the control problems inherent in joint operations involving units from two separate command headquarters. Finally, the lack of enemy contact generated a lapse of enthusiasm which resulted in tactica1 carelessness among indigenous personnel. C 2 Oct - 8 Oct The three personnel moved by vehicle to the location where a skeleton had first been discovered in The 1st platoon soon joined the Cmdr SMF, SGR, and DSA, and for the next thirty-six hours conducted an extensive search for skeletal remains thought to have been overlooked at the time of the initial collection effort.

No further skeletal remains could be located. The search was discontinued after SGR personnel concluded that any additional effort appeared futile.

At the conclusion of this mission the 1st platoon conducted an additional search in the vicinity of the Song Ba river adjacent to the north end of the An Khe air field. SGR records indicated that two US bodies had not been recovered from the site of a crash of a C The ensuing search failed to locate the remains.

Even though no remains were recovered in the search, SGR was able to determine conclusively that any future attempt to recover remains on these particular cases, i. From 6 October the entire unit was on a 45 minute standby alert as a reaction force for an STT training operation which was being conducted northeast of Pleiku.

C 9 Oct - 15 Oct At about hrs one OP fired claymores at 2 VC. The main body of the platoon quickly opened up with M The Commander of the Third Platoon followed blood trails with two squads for about meters down the hill before losing the trails in a stream.

No further contact was made. An OP then reported VC dressed in black pajamas moving south to north armed with one AK and ammo chest pack but carrying no other equipment. The radio relay site was moved about meters on No further enemy contact was made. Beginning October 3rd platoon moved to a pick up zone and extracted by VNAF helicopter without further contact.

The 1st platoon later conducted a reconnaissance in Phu Nhon district from 13 to 15 Oct. The following is an account of the execution phase of this operation narrated by the Platoon Leader: Locate and verify the size of an estimated 70 man VC force. Suspected location vicinity AR period. No enemy activity during the night. The following morning 14 Oct , after conducting a cloverleaf patrol outside the NDP and withdrawing the ambush set out the previous night, I moved the platoon east to AR